The concept of instinct espoused in psychology in the early 20th century and the contemporary concept of psychological adaptation invite comparison. Definitions of both employ the notions of inheritance, selection, functional specificity, and species typicality. This article examines how psychologists before the rise of behaviourism sought to establish instinct as a psychological phenomenon. One of the consequences of doing so was a decoupling of psychological and physiological forms of instinct. This led to a failure of constraint in the usage of (...) the term instinct and the abandonment of the project to establish it as foundational. I argue that the notion of psychological adaptations at the heart of contemporary evolutionary psychology as espoused by John Tooby and Leda Cosmides invites similar difficulties and may come to share a similar fate. (shrink)

An element of the contemporary dispute amongst evolution minded psychologists and social scientists hinges on the conception of mind as being adapted as opposed to adaptive. This dispute is not trivial. The possibility that human minds are both adapted and adaptive courtesy of selection pressures that were social in nature is of particular interest to a putative evolutionary social psychology. I suggest that the notion of an evolved psychological adaptation in social psychology can be retained only if it is accepted (...) that this adaptation is for social interaction and has no rigidly fixed function and cannot be described in terms of algorithmic decision rules or fixed inferential procedures. What is held to be the reason for encephalisation in the Homo lineage and some of best atested ideas in social psychology offers license for such an approach. (shrink)

This article argues that in the ordinary course of events, most parents routinely practice “reproductive teleology” in that they attempt to manipulate the physical and psychological characteristics of children, and they do so as part of the process of good parenting. Furthermore, such attempts are socially approved of and encouraged. With these two considerations in mind, it is argued that common objections to technological interventions, especially with respect to designer babies— based on the grounds that such processes would promote despotic (...) parenting, deny children an open future, and interfere with the designed child's sense of self—should be seen in the context of reproductive teleology. The implications of this argument encourage an orientation toward the salience of social pressures that promote reproductive teleology. (shrink)